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Background The pandemic of 2009 was caused by an H1N1
(H1N1pdm) virus of swine origin. This pandemic virus has
repeatedly infected swine through reverse zoonosis, although the
extent of such infection in swine remains unclear.
Objective This study targets small and commercial pig producers
in North Vietnam, in order to estimate the extent of H1N1pdm
infection in swine and to identify the risk factors of infection.
Methods Virologic and serologic surveillance of swine was carried
out in 2009–2010 in pig farms (38 swabs and 1732 sera) and at a
pig slaughterhouse (710 swabs and 459 sera) in North Vietnam.
The sera were screened using a influenza type A-reactive ELISA
assay, and positive sera were tested using hemagglutination
inhibition tests for antibody to a panel of H1-subtype viruses
representing pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (H1N1pdm), triple
reassortant (TRIG), classical swine (CS), and Eurasian avian-like
(EA) swine lineages. Farm-level risk factors were identified using a
zero-inflated negative binomial model.
Results We found a maximal seroprevalence of H1N1pdm of
55Æ6% [95% CI: 38Æ1–72Æ1] in the slaughterhouse at the end of
December 2009, 2 weeks after the peak of reported human
fatalities with H1N1pdm. Farm-level seroprevalence was 29%
[95% CI: 23Æ2–35Æ7]. In seropositive farms, within-herd
seroprevalence ranged from 10 to 100%. We identified an
increased risk of infection for farms that specialized in fattening
and a decreased risk of infection in farms hiring external swine
workers.
Conclusions Our findings suggest extensive reverse-zoonotic
transmission from humans to pigs with subsequent onward
transmission within pig herds.
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Introduction
The first human influenza pandemic of 21st century was
an H1N1-subtype virus that emerged through reassortment
of North American triple reassortant (TRIG) and Eurasian
Avian-like (EA) viruses of swine.1,2 The marked antigenic
differences between the pandemic and contemporary
seasonal H1 viruses resulted in a large segment of the
human population, especially those of younger age, being
immunologically naı¨ve to the new pandemic.3 The pan-
demic virus has repeatedly infected swine through reverse
zoonosis and has reassorted with other viruses of swine,
and this poses a new venue within which novel viruses
may emerge to threaten human health.4,5 It is therefore
important to enhance the surveillance of influenza viruses
of swine. As part of a longitudinal study investigating the
influenza viruses of swine in North Vietnam, we collected
sera from pigs at slaughterhouses and in villages during
the winter of 2009–2010. We report here suggestive evi-




The Red River Delta (North Vietnam) is characterized by
one of the highest animal and human densities within the
country with 500 pigs ⁄ km2 and 932 person ⁄ km2, respec-
tively, against 83Æ3 pigs ⁄km2 and 260 person ⁄ km2 at
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systems are dominant and account for approximately 80%
of the national pig population.8
Study design and data collection
Slaughterhouse monitoring
A survey was performed in Hanoi pig slaughterhouse,
which receives animals from the whole Red River Delta.
Samples were collected monthly from October 2009 to May
2010, with a doubled frequency of sampling in the winter
months December to February. At each visit, 50 pigs were
randomly selected by a systematic sampling strategy. The
sampling interval was computed on the basis of the num-
ber of expected pigs the night of visit, which was provided
by the veterinary services. Two tracheal swabs and one
blood sample were collected from each animal. A question-
naire was addressed to the pig sellers to record the indivi-
dual origin and the age of each selected pig.
Survey in pig farms
Two cross-sectional surveys were performed in pig farms
during April 2009 and in the winter 2009–2010. A multi-
stage sampling protocol was applied in six districts, from
two provinces: Ha Noi and Bac Giang (only in April 2009).
Pig farms were randomly selected from the list of farms
provided by local veterinary services or based on a random
selection of geographic coordinates. The sample size was
calculated using WinEpiscope 2.0 [CLIVE; Royal Dick
School of Veterinary Studies, Edinburgh, UK]. The number
of farms required to estimate the herd-level seroprevalence
of swine influenza was computed on the basis of an
expected prevalence <10% in April (spring) and 20% in
the winter 2009–2010.9 The number of pigs per farm was
estimated to detect an expected within-herd seroprevalence
of 30%. A total of 122 farms in April and 198 farms in the
winter were required. At least 10 pigs per farm had to be
collected. When the herd size was smaller than the required
sample size, all animals were collected. Animals were ran-
domly selected using a simple sampling strategy when pigs
were reared in only one pen and a multistage sampling
strategy when age groups were separated. All pigs included
in the sample were at least 2 months old in order to avoid
any serological reaction because of maternal antibodies. To
our knowledge, no vaccination against swine flu was per-
formed in Vietnam. Nasal swabs were collected from
animals with respiratory syndromes.
Laboratory assays
Virologic assays
Viral isolations from tracheal or nasal swabs were attempted
on Madin-Darby canine kidney (MDCK) cells cultured in
minimum essential medium (MEM) supplemented with 1%
penicillin–streptomycin (P ⁄ S) and 2 lg ⁄ml of 1-tosylamide-
2-phenylethyl chloromethyl ketone (TPCK)-treated trypsin
as described elsewhere.10,11 The cells were observed by
microscopy for cytopathic effect (CPE) for 7 days. If CPE
was detected or otherwise when cells remained CPE negative
up to 7 days post-inoculation, the cells were scraped, fixed in
70% acetone, and stained for influenza A viral antigen using
A B C
Figure 1. (A) Pig and (B) Human densities in North Vietnam. (C) Seroprevalence of H1 pandemic in provinces of origin of pigs collected in Hanoi
slaughterhouse from October 2009 to May 2010 and human fatal cases during the 2009 ⁄ 2010 epidemic (from September 2009 to February 2010).
Trevennec et al.
2 ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses
DAKO Imagen Flu A antibody (DAKO Diagnostics, IMA-
GEN Influenza, Dakocytomation, Denmark).
Additionally, all swab samples were tested by RT-PCR as
previously described.12 Viral RNA were extracted from the
swab specimens using the QIAamp Virus BioRobot MDx Kit
(Qiagen, GmbH, Hilden, Germany) on the BioRobot Uni-
versal System (Qiagen, Invitrogen Life Technologies, Inc.,
CA, USA) after optimization and validation for use on swab
samples.13 Random and Uni12 primers were used for cDNA
synthesis using Superscript III Reverse Transcriptase
(Invitrogen). The BioRobot Universal System was used to set
up the reaction mixture, and reverse transcription was per-
formed in a GeneAmp 9700 Thermocycler (Applied
Biosystems). Subsequent to the reactions, 20 ll of cDNA was
diluted 1 ⁄ 10 by adding 180 ll of AE buffer (Qiagen) and
used for testing on real-time PCR using the LightCycler 480
SYBR Green master mix (Roche) with the primers (forward
primer M52C (5¢-CTT CTA ACC GAG GTC GAA ACG-3¢
and reverse primer M253R 5¢-AGG GCA TTT TGG ACA
AAG ⁄T CGT CTA-3¢). The primers was designed to amplify
the sequences in the conserved region of influenza A virus
matrix gene, thereby detecting viruses from different virus
subtypes including swine influenza viruses.12 In each assay,
serially diluted plasmids containing the full-length M gene
cloned from A ⁄Vietnam ⁄ 1204 ⁄ 2004 (H5N1) were included
as standards to perform absolute quantification. Criteria for
samples positive for influenza virus are those with Cp values
<45 with a sharp melting curve peak around 85C.
Serological assays
All sera were first screened using ID Screen (ID-Vet,
Montpellier, France) competitive ELISA for influenza A
(using nucleoprotein NP as antigen) according to the man-
ufacturer’s instructions. The ELISA-positive sera were sub-
sequently tested after receptor-destroying enzyme (RDE)
treatment and heat inactivation, using the hemagglutina-
tion inhibition (HI) test for H1- and H3-subtype influenza
viruses. The HI tests were performed according to the stan-
dard procedures from World Health Organization, using
turkey red blood cells.14 Viruses representative of different
swine virus lineages were selected based on extensive stud-
ies in southern China. 10,11 Four H1-subtype viruses such
as swine triple reassortant (A ⁄ swine ⁄HK ⁄ 1110 ⁄ 2006;
TRIG), Eurasian avian (A ⁄HK ⁄NS29 ⁄ 2009; EA), classical
swine (A ⁄ swine ⁄HK ⁄ 4167 ⁄ 1999; CS), and swine-origin
pandemic 2009 virus (A ⁄CA ⁄ 4 ⁄ 2009; H1N1pdm) and four
H3N2 viruses such as Eurasian avian-like A ⁄ swine ⁄
HK ⁄ 1197 ⁄ 02, human A ⁄ Sydney ⁄ 5 ⁄ 97-like swine virus
A ⁄ swine ⁄HK ⁄ 2422 ⁄ 1998, contemporary human Brisbane-
like A ⁄OK ⁄ 483 ⁄ 2008, and A ⁄ swine ⁄HK ⁄ 2503 ⁄ 2011 were
used in this study. They were propagated and titrated
following standard procedures on MDCK cells.14 Viral
titers were calculated by the Reed and Muench method.15
If sera had reactions to multiple antigenically related
H1-subtype viruses, we categorized a serum as having a
homologous reaction profile to H1N1pdm positive if that
serum had ‡fourfold higher HI titer to H1N1pdm antigen
compared with all other H1-subtype viruses. A serum that
was seropositive to more than one H1N1 virus antigen
with titers within fourfold of each other was defined as
undetermined H1 reactivity. A serum that was ELISA-A




Animal-level prevalence of virus carriage or seropositivity
to H1N1pdm with the associated confidence intervals was
computed with the exact binomial method from the
EpiTools package using R version 2.12.0.16–18
Seroprevalence of H1N1pdm was computed for each visit
at the pig slaughterhouse and mapped in the Red River
Delta using Arcview 9.3 (ESRI, Redlands, CA, USA). The
within-herd seroprevalence of H1N1pdm was computed for
each farm. Longitude and latitude were used to mark the
farm locations and to explore the spatial dependence
between seropositive farms. The spatial autocorrelation pat-
tern was described using Moran’s I statistic computed at
various spatial lags (i.e. the Moran’s I statistic was per-
formed for each kilometer from 0 to 10 km and then for
each additional 5 km from 10 to 20 km).19
Results were plotted with the human epidemic curve,
which was drawn according to reported cases provided by
the Partnership on Avian and Human Pandemic Influenza
(PAHI) on the website http://www.avianinfluenza.org.vn/.
Identification of risk factors
We performed two levels of analyses using R (version
2.12.0):17 one at the province level using the slaughterhouse
dataset and one at the farm level using the results of cross-
sectional surveys performed after the emergence of
H1N1pdm in April 2009.
At the province level, the dependant variable was the
proportion of seropositive pigs for H1N1pdm. The seropre-
valence was tested according to two explicative variables,
the pig and human densities. Potential association with
both predictors was tested using the Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient.
At the farm level, the dependant variable was the count
of H1-seropositive pigs within the farm. A total of 14
farm-level potential risk factors of H1N1pdm seropositivity
and first-degree interactions were investigated. Quantitative
variables (number of family members and number of pigs)
were categorized when the creation of new biologic or
logical variables was possible to correct for the problem of
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linearity. The 14 covariates are presented in Table 1. The
collinearity between categorical variables was tested using
the two-sided Fisher’s exact test. When two covariates were
correlated, they were tested separately in the model
selection.
Because there were evidences of overdispersion (v2 test
for overdispersion:19 P value > 0Æ05), owing to both clus-
tering of animals in herds and an ‘excess of zeros’, a zero-
inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model was computed to
assess the associations between the dependant variable and
farm-level predictors.18–21 The ZINB model performed
simultaneously a count model (log link) and a binary
model (logit link). The parameter modeled in the count
model is the probability of counting N seropositive pigs
within a seropositive farm. The log-transformed number of
animals collected in each farm was included in this model,
as an additional variable to offset the sample size effect.
The parameter modeled in the binary model is the proba-
bility of a zero count.18 Independent covariates and first-
degree interactions were included in a multivariate ZINB
model and selected manually using backward and forward
procedures, based on the lowest Akaike’s information crite-
rion (AIC). Finally, the Vuong test was performed to check
whether the ZINB model fitted the data better than regular
negative binomial model.18
Results
Virus isolation in pigs
Of 710 RT-PCR performed on pig swabs collected in the
slaughterhouse and 38 collected in pig farms affected by a
respiratory syndrome during the winter 2009–2010, none
Table 1. Farm-level variables as reported by farmers in the winter 2009 ⁄ 2010 in Ha Noi province




Farm type Farrowing ⁄ fattening 207 29
Fattening only 71




Number of piglets (<8 weeks) None 207 69
<10 22
>10 9
Number of growing pigs (8–12 weeks) None 207 41
<10 42
>10 18
Number of finishing pigs (>12 weeks) None 207 32
<10 29
>10 39
Number of purchase per year None 207 54
<30 33
>30 13
Human–swine interface and sanitary information
Home-made feed (kitchen wastes) No 207 33
Yes 67
External employee No 207 89
Yes 11
Family members involved in pig production One 207 6
Two 69
More than 2 25
Wear specific clothes and mask No 206 46
Yes 54
Disinfect hands No 206 100
Yes 0
Visitor restriction All allowed 203 91
Only professionals 9
Respiratory syndrome reported in
the last 12 months
No 207 66
Yes 34
Date of sample collection December 2009 207 48
January 2010 52
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were positive. The maximum virus prevalence in slaughter-
house and farms was estimated at 0Æ52% and 9Æ2%,
respectively (upper limit of confidence intervals).
Seroprevalence to swine influenza viruses
Samples collected in pig slaughterhouse in Hanoi
(n = 459 pigs) and pig farms (n = 1732 pigs from 207
farms) gave serological evidence of swine exposure to the
H1N1pdm (Figure 2A,B respectively). The prevalence of
sera in slaughterhouses having a homologous reaction
profile (‡fourfold higher titers compared with other H1
viruses tested) to H1N1pdm overall during the period
October 2009 to May 2010 was 97 (21%) of 459 sera
tested. The seroprevalence increased from 6Æ0% [95% CI:
1Æ3–16Æ5] in October 2009 to peak at 55Æ6% [95% CI:
38Æ1–72Æ1] by the end of December 2009 and declined
thereafter (Figure 3). Only 11 (2Æ4%) of 459 sera had a
homologous titer to any other swine H1 virus, viz
Eurasian avian-like swine (EA), triple reassortant (TRIG),
or classical swine (CS). Of these sera, 48 (10Æ5%) had
reactivity to H1N1pdm and also had comparable (within
fourfold) antibody titers to one or more other swine H1
viruses and are classified as cross-reactive or undeter-
mined H1. The numbers of sera with this serological pro-
file also increased in December 2009, and it is likely that
some of these also reflect H1N1pdm infections. The peak
of seroprevalence to H1N1pdm in the end of December
2009 followed the peak of human fatal cases by around
2 months.
Pigs collected in Hanoi slaughterhouse came from 13
different provinces, and 11 of these were found to have
some H1N1pdm-seropositive animals. As shown on the
map (Figure 1C), there was serological evidence that pigs
from the whole Red River Delta have been exposed to the
H1N1pdm virus.
The estimated farm-level seroprevalence for H1N1pdm
was 29Æ5% [95% CI: 23Æ3–35Æ7] in the Red River Delta dur-
ing the winter 2009–2010. The location of exposed farms
was scattered in the whole study area (Figure 4). The num-
ber of pig sera collected in each farm ranged from 3 to 10.
A
B
Figure 2. Serological distribution of samples
from (A) slaughterhouse or (B) farm in the
Red River Delta during the winter 2009–2010.
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Among seropositive farms, the within-herd seroprevalence
for H1N1pdm was estimated on average at 45% with a
minimum of 10% and a maximum of 100%. The Moran’s
I statistic remained closed to zero and insignificant from 0 to
20 km, demonstrating the absence of spatial autocorrelation
between seropositive farms.
Risk factors of H1 pandemic seropositivity
At the province level, pig and human densities in the Red
River Delta were not associated with the seroprevalence of
H1N1pdm in pigs. The correlation coefficients were esti-
mated at 0Æ38 for both variables, and Spearman’s correla-
tion tests were not significant (P-values > 0Æ20). As only
one farm stated that they disinfect hands when carrying
pigs, this variable was removed from the analysis of risk
factors at the farm level.
Fisher’s tests showed some correlations between farm-
level variables. Farms specialized in fattening were associ-
ated with a large number of finishing pigs (40Æ0% had
more than 10 finishing pigs, against 23Æ8% of farrow-
ing ⁄ fattening farms), whereas farrowing ⁄finishing farms
had much more piglets (57Æ1% had some piglets, against
<2% of fattening farms). As expected, the purchase was
also associated with the type of farm, the number of pig-
lets, and the number of finishing pigs. The purchase of
small quantities of pigs (<30 per year) was also correlated
with the report of respiratory syndrome diseases. In
addition, farms where a large percentage (>50%) of familial
income was provided by pig production were corre-
lated with the small number of finishing pigs (<10 pigs).
Correlated variables were tested separately in the model
selection.
The ZINB model was implemented to investigate the role
of the 13 remaining potential risk factors. The final model
was selected on the basis of the lowest AIC among various
combinations of independent covariates and first-degree
interactions selected for both the logistic model and the
count model. As shown in Table 2A, farms that are special-
ized in fattening [OR: 0Æ35 (0Æ17; 0Æ70)] were associated
with a decreased risk of being free from H1N1pdm, mean-
ing an increased risk of farm infection. In the count model
(Table 2B), the employment of external swine workers was
associated with a low number of seropositive pigs. The pre-
dicted counts fitted the data. The Vuong test had a positive
value (3Æ99; P value < 0Æ01), indicating that the ZINB
model fitted the data better than regular negative binomial
model.
Discussion
H1N1pdm seroprevalence in swine at the Hanoi slaughter-
house rapidly increased during the winter of 2009, to peak
at overall seroprevalence of 55Æ6% [95% CI: 38Æ1–72Æ1] of
all animals tested by the end of December 2009 (Figure 3).
As in many other parts of Asia, H1N1pdm infection was
introduced to Vietnam in June–July 2009.22 The detailed
epidemic curve of human H1N1pdm infections in North
Vietnam is not yet available. However, the reported num-
bers of fatal H1N1pdm cases peaked in October–November
2009 (Figure 3) and thus appear to have preceded the peak
of seroconversion in swine by 1–2 months. This may well
reflect the delay between infection and seroconversion of
pigs and also the time interval between their infection in
the farms and their sale for slaughter. The farm-level
Figure 3. Seroprevalence swine influenza H1 all subtypes and H1N1pdm spreading in pigs collected in Hanoi slaughterhouse from October 2009 to
May 2010 and monthly incidence of fatal cases in human in Vietnam.
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seroprevalence for H1N1pdm was 29Æ5%, and within-herd
seroprevalence in infected farms ranged from 10 to 100%.
The data are therefore suggestive of extensive spill-over
of H1N1pdm from humans to swine and efficient
transmission of the virus within herds. The low seropreva-
lence of H1 viruses in swine prior to November 2009
would have facilitated explosive outbreaks of H1N1pdm
infection in swine. However, the lack of geographic
Figure 4. Location of seropositive farms for
H1N1pdm (cross-sectional survey in the Red
River Delta, winter 2009–2010).
Table 2. Final multivariable ZINB model for H1 pandemic positivity in swine farms of the Red River Delta during the winter 2009–2010. The
parameter modeled in the binary model is the probability of a zero count, which represents the probability of a farm being seronegative (A). The
parameter modeled in the count model is the probability of counting N seropositive pigs within a seropositive farm (B)
Variable Category OR 95% CI P value
(A) Zero-inflated model (logit link)
Type of farm Farrowing ⁄ fattening
Fattening only 0Æ35 0Æ17–0Æ70 <0Æ01
Variable Category Estimate SE P value
(B) Count model (log link)
External swine worker Yes )1Æ23 0Æ4 <0Æ01
OR, odds ratio; SE, standard error.
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clustering of infected farms is more compatible with multi-
ple discrete transmission events from humans to swine
amplifying within each swineherd but not spreading exten-
sively between swineherds. The geographic overlap in the
occurrence of human fatal cases and seroprevalence of
H1N1pdm in swine (Figure 1C) corroborates this
assumption.
Seroprevalence in swine declined after the peak in
December 2009–January 2010, suggesting that the
H1N1pdm virus was not sustaining high-level virus trans-
mission in swine. This may reflect the reduction of infec-
tion in the source (viz humans) but increasing herd
immunity in swine may also contribute to this decline in
virus activity in pigs. Pig production in Vietnam peaks
prior to the Teˆt festival in February. The post-Teˆt decline
in the susceptible pig population as well as commercial
trade after Teˆt may have also contributed to the decline in
seroprevalence. Seasonal factors may also play a role.
Our results are consistent with cases of human-to-swine
H1N1pdm transmissions already observed in farms:
Canada,23 Thailand,24 and Korea25 (three independent
human-to-swine transmissions). Because we had only sero-
logical data, we could not determine whether these trans-
mission events were single or several cross-species
transmissions. While our data are suggestive of extensive
transmission of H1N1pdm within swine herds, it is also
suggesting that virus activity is not self-sustaining at high
levels in pigs. Reassortants between H1N1pdm and swine
viruses have already been isolated in Asia.4 If the spread of
H1N1pdm in the Vietnamese swine population continues
even at low frequency, this human virus may also reassort
in Vietnam with swine viruses, as it has been recently
observed for H3N2.26 Further investigation, including
continuous monitoring, molecular epidemiology, and
modeling, would be necessary to elucidate such questions.
The differences between seroprevalences estimated in
slaughterhouse and farms may be related to a number of
possible biases including the clustering of animals at farm
level, the age of animals, and geographic location. Pigs sent
to the slaughterhouse are older than those collected in
farms and have more opportunity to have been infected.
The swine sampled in farms originate only from the Ha
Noi province, while pigs sampled in the slaughterhouse
come from a broader region of the Red River Delta.
There are a number of limitations in our study which is
likely to underestimate the prevalence of H1N1pdm infec-
tion in swine. Serological testing of swine sera for
H1N1pdm by HI tests was only carried out on sera that
were positive in screening influenza type A ELISA assay.
The sensitivity of such ELISA assays is likely to be less than
ideal, and this would be lead to underestimation of the
overall H1N1pdm seropositivity in swine.27 There is a pro-
portion of sera (up to 22Æ5% in February 2010) that had
evidence of influenza type A antibody detected in ELISA
tests but were negative for the different antigenic variants
of H1-subtype swine influenza viruses. This suggests that
other subtypes of influenza may be circulating in swine in
Vietnam. We included three H3N2 viruses in our panel of
virus antigens, viz Eurasian avian-like H3N2; human-like
H3N2 swine viruses isolated in Hong Kong in 1998 with
A ⁄ Sydney ⁄ 5 ⁄ 97-like hemagglutinin;11 and more recent
human H3N2 viruses from 2008, with no evidence of virus
activity which was surprising.11 H3-subtype viruses have
been reported in swine in China9 and Thailand.24 More
recently, H3N2 viruses (e.g., A ⁄ swine ⁄Binh Duo-
ng ⁄ 03_08 ⁄ 2010) have been isolated from swine in South
Vietnam with H3 hemagglutinins that are closely related
genetically and antigenically to human H3N2 viruses
A ⁄New York ⁄ 365 ⁄ 2004 and A ⁄Wyoming ⁄ 3 ⁄ 200326 and to
a recently isolated virus from Hong Kong A ⁄ swi-
ne ⁄HK ⁄ 2503 ⁄ 2011 (H3N2). Interestingly, in our study car-
ried out in North Vietnam, none of the pigs have evidence
of antibody to A ⁄ swine ⁄HK ⁄ 2503 ⁄ 2011 (H3N2).
Virus isolation attempts from 748 swabs collected during
this study did not yield virus isolates. This may in part be
related to freezing and thawing of these swabs and also
poor-cold chain management as viral isolation could not
be carried out at the local laboratory. On the other hand,
another recent study of swine influenza in Vietnam found
detectable virus only in two pooled swabs of 759 tested,
both coming from the same farm.26 This and other studies
suggest that virus isolation rates from swine are low and
larger numbers of swabs need to be tested in order to be
successful at isolating viruses. Availability of local virus iso-
lates would have allowed us to use better matched strain
for the HI serology testing, probably reducing the propor-
tion of samples that were positive for influenza type A
antibodies in the ELISA assay but negative in HI tests.
In farms, the risk of seropositive pigs was associated with
the presence of external employees. This is in fact counter-
intuitive as one would expect that a more heterogeneous
work-force will lead to increased risk of introduction of
human H1N1pdm infection to swine. Unfortunately, our
epidemiological survey data were not precise enough to
propose a more detailed explanation for this observation;
for example, are employed swine workers more respectful
of biosecurity, do they use more self-protection, or are they
less inclined to work when they are sick?
Between-farm transmission may occur either via humans
(interspecies) or pigs (intraspecies). To our knowledge, no
previous study has reported farm-level seroprevalence or
risk factors of H1N1pdm in swine. A farm may be infected
by infected humans, swine, or fomites. The relatively low
proportion of seropositive farms, scattered locations
(Figure 4), and the absence of spatial autocorrelation favor
limited local diffusion from farm to farm. Thus, the
Trevennec et al.
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observations are in favor of independent farm infections,
possibly with infected humans being the major source of
infection. However, the number of family members work-
ing on the farm, the employment of swine workers, the
restriction of visitors, or the wearing of protective clothes ⁄ -
masks was not significantly associated with swine infection
risk. The risk factor analyses highlighted an increased risk
of farm infection for farms specialized in fattening. Such
farms are characterized by the frequent purchase of grow-
ing pigs and larger numbers of finishing pigs. Regular
introduction of new animals may contribute to the
increased infection risk.
Conclusion
Our seroepidemiological investigations performed in com-
mercial pig farms and a pig slaughterhouse in Vietnam
provide evidence that suggests extensive transmission of
H1N1pdm from humans to swine and efficient within-
herd transmission in infected farms. However, limited
evidence of farm-to-farm transmission and the declining
seroprevalence in swine by mid-2010 suggests that long-
term and sustained maintenance of H1N1pdm in swine-
herds has so far not occurred. Viral reassortment may of
course lead to viruses with greater efficiency in becoming
endemic in swine populations. These findings highlight
the need for further studies including virus isolation and
molecular epidemiology to define the future trajectory of
the H1N1pdm virus in pigs and to assess future threats
to human health.
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